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Abstract
This paper proposes an agent-based model that combines both spot and
balancing electricity markets. From this model, we develop a multi-agent simu-
lation to study the integration of the consumers’ flexibility into the system. Our
study identifies the conditions that real-time prices may lead to higher electric-
ity costs, which in turn contradicts the usual claim that such a pricing scheme
reduces cost.
We show that such undesirable behavior is in fact systemic. Due to the
existing structure of the wholesale market, the predicted demand that is used
in the formation of the price is never realized since the flexible users will change
their demand according to such established price.
As the demand is never correctly predicted, the volume traded through the
balancing markets increases, leading to higher overall costs. In this case, the
system can sustain, and even benefit from, a small number of flexible users, but
this solution can never upscale without increasing the total costs.
To avoid this problem, we implement the so-called ”exclusive groups”. Our
results illustrate the importance of rethinking the current practices so that flex-
ibility can be successfully integrated considering scenarios with and without
intermittent renewable sources.
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1. Introduction
In our free market economies, monetary incentives are usually seen as a way
to change human behavior. This assumption is widespread, going from cost-
benefits decisions of our everyday life to economic policies of countries. It seems
natural, hence, to assume that exposing end-users of electric power to varying
prices will inevitably result in behaviors that maximize the efficiency of the
electricity system. One of the earliest mentions about this idea can be found in
[1] and [2]. Both articles discuss the problem of peak loads and pricing schemes
that discourage customers from using electric power during such high demand
periods. The proposed two-tariff system has been implemented afterwards and
is still in use. For example in the UK, the so-called “Economy 7” tariffs have a
cheaper electricity price for seven hours during the night [3]. There, such tariffs
are typically used in conjunction with storage heaters to store cheap power from
the night to heat the house during the day.
In recent years this idea has been taken further: the customers in some
places have the option to choose the so-called real-time price [4]. As the name
suggests this price should reflect the cost of producing electricity in “real-time”
and therefore allow the customers to allocate their flexible demand (e.g. washing
machines, dish washers or charging of electric cars) during times where power is
cheaper. This would then align the needs of the system, e.g. reducing peak load
to avoid overloading of power lines, with the interest of consumers to save money,
assuming of course that the price correctly reflects any bottlenecks in production
or transmission [1]. The concept of a real-time price is also in the core of many
concepts of the evolving power grid, the smart grid, where decentralization and
intermittent production drive the need for new coordination mechanisms [5].
This development however seems curious when compared to the findings of [1]
back in 1951: “We shall not proceed to consider tariffs with three or more
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running charges, as the introduction of further rates yields rapidly diminishing
returns, while consumer costs increase accordingly.”
From the current technological perspective in combination with the liber-
alized electricity system, this argument however looks inappropriate: not only
does the market generate public price information with at least hourly resolu-
tion, but also there exists technological means to inform and charge the customer
with the same time resolution. Therefore, the idea to expose customers to these
hour-by-hour prices seems straightforward.
Yet, the power system is changing in two fundamental ways with the in-
troduction of renewable energy sources. Power is no longer produced only by
centralized stations, but rather it is becoming more and more collected in a dis-
tributed manner due to the increasing number of intermittent sources like solar
and wind [6, 7]. Hence, the power system needs to coordinate a fast growing
number of players, while the volatile nature of renewable sources requires sys-
temic changes to be properly accommodated. This fact implies that models that
assume a production that creates constant merit order curves cannot be applied
nowadays. For example, the work done by [8] in fact provides a sound model
for the time and place it was developed, but is in its basic form unfit for the
reality of the modern power grid in liberalized markets with increasing number
of renewable sources (extensions have been proposed for example in [9, 10].
The price in the Nordic power system is known to be influenced by hydro
power as shown in [11] based on eleven years of historic data. The hydro reser-
voirs in Sweden, Norway and Finland behave like traditional power plants, so
that production can be scheduled to follow the power demand[12]. Germany,
in its turn, has seen negative prices for power in the recent years [13] due to
the big amounts of wind and solar that have been added to the system. These
prices occur since wind and solar cannot be scheduled in the traditional way;
the power output can only be capped.
The challenge then becomes to use or store the renewable power whenever
it is available. This would bring many positive effects from both environmen-
tal and economical perspectives: low price electricity (almost zero-marginal
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cost source) with low CO2 emission levels. This architectural change, however,
should not be underestimated. In a system dominated by traditional produc-
tion, a peak in consumption shall be avoided in order to reduce the investment
in the grid capacity and the usage of peak power plants with high production
costs. In a system dominated by variable renewable sources, conversely, a peak
in consumption may be the way to optimally utilize the available power (as in
a case of strong winds and their respective power outputs).
At the first sight, this is a good argument in favor of exposing consumers
to the variable prices of the electricity market: they are supposed to correctly
reflect the availability of renewable power or the use of expensive power plants
in peak periods. The real-time price would then set the right incentives for
consumers to allocate their flexible usage or storage capabilities, creating a win-
win situation for the consumer and the grid.
This way of reasoning is notwithstanding flawed in the sense that it mis-
conceives the day-ahead price as a reflex of the realized demand, instead of the
predicted demand. Flexible consumers guided by the real-time (i.e. spot) price
realize their consumption differently from the prediction that in fact defined
such a price. Consequently, predictions may not be realized and balancing be-
comes more necessary, which may result in higher prices as the electricity is
more expensive in balancing markets.
This work demonstrates how the current (incorrect) approach to real-time
pricing (specially for retail customers) cannot as such be sustained when the
ratio of flexible consumers grows, while the incentives are incorrectly aligned
with the model pursued in many EU countries. As an effective solution to this
systemic failure, we show that flexibility (in large scale) can be successfully in-
corporated into the system by daily profile bids instead of independent hourly
bids. Such a solution is in fact viable and already implemented in liberalized
markets as the so-called “smart blocks” (used in EPEX SPOT [14]) or “exclu-
sive groups” (used in Nord Pool [15, 16]). They work by informing the market
about different possible demand profiles, that can be realized due to the avail-
able flexibility. By covering these issues, the present work contributes to a better
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understanding of how flexibility shall be integrated into the market considering
scenarios with and without intermittent renewable sources. Further this work
introduces a reusable open source model that provides unique capabilities of
modeling production (renewable and conventional) and load on a minute by
minute basis. It can be also used to analyze the power system in a holistic
way by modeling not only the day-ahead market but also the balancing mar-
ket, therefore respecting the physical constraints of matching generation and
consumption at all times.
The rest of this article is divided as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
proposed agent-based model incorporating both spot and balancing markets,
which is used to carry out the present study. Section 3 presents the numerical
results supporting our claims, while Section 4 discusses the implications and
limitations of this work. Section 5 concludes this paper.
2. Model
In the electricity grid, supply and demand need to be balanced due to phys-
ical constraints [17]. To ensure this match in a liberalized market, electricity
is traded in several stages with increasing time resolution. Trading happens
in the following stages [16]: day-ahead market, intra-day market and balanc-
ing market. All differences that could not be accounted for in the day-ahead
market need to be corrected. This may occur in the intra-day market, but the
actual realized imbalances must be corrected at the balancing market, in real
time (minute-scale in contrast to hour-scale from spot market).
The structure of this market system has been developing over time and
reflects not only the idea of a free and efficient market with competition (e.g.
[18]) but also the engineering needs of the power system. The different time
resolutions and lead-times allow for proper long-term planning of production for
the types of power plants that are less flexible, while close to real-time markets
allow the for final adjustments driven by the physical reality of the situation.
We base our analysis on an agent-based model which was firstly introduced
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in [19] and will be extended with several features explained below. It includes
producers, utilities and consumers, while evolving around three stages of inter-
action between them. These interactions are indeed the reason why we choose
an agent-based model for our analysis instead of a more traditional analytic
model. Agent-based models [20] have been used to analyze power systems be-
fore as in [21, 22, 23, 24, 25] and have also provided a deeper understanding of
the behavior of markets [26, 27, 28, 29].
We see our model aligned with the previous research in the topic, but with
some distinctive differences. First, we aim to include the physical realities of
power systems into the market simulation by using a minute timescale instead
of a hourly based one, allowing for the inclusion of the balancing market that
covers all deviations from the day-ahead schedule. We deem this important
as fluctuations of renewable power (e.g. [30, 31]) and consumer behavior (e.g.
[32]) work on a sub-hourly timescale even down to a second or sub-second level.
While fluctuations on the sub-minute level will mostly be covered by primary
regulation (therefore by automatic systems and physical effects in the power
system), they can be neglected for a market simulation (although some mecha-
nisms of primary regulations like automatic and manual Frequency Restoration
Reserves can function as a market where the Transmission System Operators
collect offers from suppliers and use only the cheapest ones). We decided only to
handle the mechanisms that work upwards from a reaction time of a minute as
part of the balancing market. From the perspective of the present work, this still
preserves the physical reality that the system needs to be in balance while also
reflecting the market-based procurement and dispatching of these capacities.
Second, we see our model not as a tool to forecast actual prices but rather
to understand systematic effects and relations. The agent-based modeling ap-
proach is suitable with that premise as it allows not only to capture the interac-
tions between all players in a given system, but it also allows these interactions
to have non-optimal and unstable results. It is also unnecessary to assume that
prices or installed capacities are according to the long-term equilibrium, but
they will be shaped to reflect the local reality of any given agent.
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In its current form, the model excludes the intra-day market stage and finan-
cial markets. While intra-day markets have been shown to be more important
with a higher penetration of renewable sources [33], they are unnecessary to
understand the general (qualitative) patterns inside the cascade market system.
This aspect shall be introduced in a further extension of the present model.
Financial markets play a different role in different systems. In the Nord
Pool area, they can only be used as a price hedging instrument but not for
scheduling physical flows1. Consequently, they might have an influence on the
bidding behavior of market players, but less on the interaction between different
markets.
Finally, the goal of our modeling is also to follow the actual implementation
of the Nord Pool market (as well as all other European electricity markets)
as close as possible. Our approach tries in some sense to fill the important
gap indicated in [34]: “Given the narrow focuses, interactions between differ-
ent layers, e.g. with centralized wholesale electricity markets, are sometimes
neglected. Thereby, a consistent and comprehensive evaluation of effects from
smart grid structures is still difficult. Similarly, the concrete link to current
market designs and implementation steps are missing, which is why some re-
search papers remain rather academic. Issues of local acceptance are neither
addressed explicitly.”
2.1. Interaction
Our model is based on three stages of interaction depicted in Fig. 1. At
first, the utilities make a forecast about their users’ consumption to be then
submitted to the market as a bid. Forecasts are based on a historical average
with an exponential weight factor so that more recent history is more important
for the forecast. The day-ahead market matches bids from these forecasts with
the offers from producers, creating a hourly production schedule for the next
day. This process creates a price (the spot price) for each hour as the most
1http://www.nordpoolspot.com/the-power-market/Financial-market/
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Figure 1: The three interaction stages of the modeled market system. Top left: the day-ahead
market period where demand forecasts are matched against production forecasts. Top right:
the balancing market period where all deviations are adjusted for. Bottom: the monetary
settlement period.
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expensive power plant that needs to run during any given hour [35]. Since all
producers bid in their marginal cost of production this price also reflects the
production price.
Next, all mismatches between realized and forecasted production and con-
sumption are calculated for every fifteen (15) minutes in the model. If the
mismatch exceeds a certain value it will be balanced by a matching offer from
a producer at the balancing market. Every producer can offer power into the
balancing market, given certain internal limitations, to reflect the behavior of
different types of power plants.
All producers have a minimum run requirement that determines if they can
offer balancing energy even if they were not dispatched for that hour in the
day-ahead market. They also have a regulation factor that determines how
much they can individually change their output for balancing from the value
dispatched during the day-ahead period. Furthermore, every producer will bid
its marginal cost with an additional factor into the balancing market. Producers
can also submit several offers for the same period, for example with a certain
amount of MWh for a lower and an additional amount for a higher price.
In the final stage, all settlements are accounted for monetarily. This means
all transactions according to the market are executed, so producers get payed for
their production while utilities pay for their consumption. If any party deviated
from its day-ahead schedule, it has to pay the balancing price, accordingly. For
this purpose, the Nordic model consists of a two-price system for producers and
one-price system for consumers [36]. The users are all assumed to be under a
real-time pricing regime, so rates are according to the day-ahead prices (which
is a common practice in the Nordic area). Users are charged according to their
actual consumption of any given day. The balancing costs will be paid by the
utilities, as the market participants, for any deviations from the agreed schedule.
However, they will be subsequently charged from the users as fixed costs, equally
shared between all users of a given utility.
9
2.2. Flexibility
Different from our previous work [19], this paper considers that users have
the ability to change their electricity usage. This flexibility can be utilized
to shift power consumption away from high-price times to low-price ones to
minimize consumer costs. As a simplification, the usage patterns are modeled
as sine curves so that optimizing agents need to set the phase of their respective
sine curve to simulate a shift in the usage pattern, illustrated in Fig. 2. This does
not change the shape of the use, but rather simulates the shift of peak power to
a different time of the day. This is also consistent with the rebound effect [37],
which considers that a reduction of the load during one part of the day is usually
followed or preceded by a higher consumption to compensate for the reduced
usage. While the assumption of simple sinusoidal load curves might seem too
simplistic considering highly sophisticated models for loads and their flexibility
like [38, 39, 40], our aim is to present a neglected systemic effect without any
unnecessary complications. In others words, we have targeted to build a model
that is “as simple as possible but no simpler.” This model would serve as basis
for further studies, these involving more realistic models. Nevertheless, to test
the consistence of the proposed scenario, we provide preliminary results of a
more intricate way of modeling load curves in the appendix Appendix A, which
shows a similar behavior to the ones presented along our main results.
To find the optimal shift time, each consumer calculates a correlation of its
own usage and the hourly prices of the day-ahead market at the beginning of
each simulation day after the prices of the day-ahead market have been an-
nounced. The position of the minimum value in the resulting correlation vector
then marks the optimal shift time, as usage during low price times are maxi-
mized and minimized during high price times. We also assume that the flexible
load is completely automated. Due to the short-term changes of power availabil-
ity from renewable sources, only automated reactions can provide the needed
reaction time. We will analyze this assumption further in the discussion part of
this article.
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Figure 2: Load curve examples of an optimizing, flexible user and an ordinary user in the
RTP regime. The optimizing user shifts his load by adjusting the phase of the sine curve to
have minimum correlation with the price curve. Note: the usage is scaled and not zero based.
2.3. Exclusive Groups
As to be discussed in the next section, the user-centric, price-based, opti-
mization may lead to undesirable (and usually unexpected) outcomes. As we
shall demonstrate, these outcomes could be mitigated by the use of so-called
“exclusive groups” (EXG) [41] (or “smart blocks”). EXGs are one possible way
(together with flexible orders or linked block orders [41], which are not imple-
mented here) of biding flexibility directly into the day-ahead market by offering
several different groups of hourly offers/bids. The market matching algorithm
then selects exactly one of these profiles, which the agent then has to follow.
An example of an EXG bid (formed by several profiles) is shown in Fig. 3. In
this way, flexibility is directly visible for the market, which shall select the set
of profiles that optimize social welfare. The details of implemented calculation
can be found in the model[42] and as pseudo-code in Appendix Appendix B.
It is worth stressing that this type of offer is not an idea of the authors,
but rather an already available product in several European day-ahead market
places, yet almost ignored in research.. Public documentation shows its intended
usage [14] and also indicates a growth in its use [43]. Note also that this solution
presupposes that the flexibility can be fully used by the utilities. In other words,
the utilities shall have the control of flexible loads in order to realize all proposed
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Figure 3: Different profiles of a single utility. The market algorithm has to select the profile
which will deliver globally optimal results.
curves. Utilities may implement this by direct load control, by internal pricing
strategies, or by some color flagging scheme. Although this is of core importance
for the actual implementation and upscaling of this solution, we assume here
that the utilities can deliver the bidding curves and their users are charged
following the market output.
2.4. Model Setup
As mentioned before, we do not intend to forecast price, but rather con-
tribute to the understanding of systematic effects when integrating flexibility in
the electricity market. To do so, we shall set the proposed model to qualitatively
behave in a sound manner, while not necessarily providing quantitatively realis-
tic results. Therefore, although we are not targeting at a precise price forecast,
we do need to calibrate the proposed multi-agent simulation with suitable data.
The core of the setup is the merit order curve that defines prices at the
day-ahead market and, to a certain extent, at the balancing market. The used
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Figure 4: Left: the merit order curve used for the day ahead market. Right: part of the day
ahead merit order curve compared to 2015 data from Nord Pool for the Finnish day ahead
market including a fit though the data.
merit order curve, as well as a comparison to real-world data taken from Nord
Pool, can be seen in Fig. 4. The comparison to Nord Pool prices is not only
there to show that the general shape of the merit order curve is valid, but also
to discuss another interesting effect. As can be seen by the data from June,
peak time prices during summer can be as high as during winter, even though
the average consumption and prices are much lower. The reasons for this effect
are possibly several:
• the power plants that run during peak consumption hours are the same
during summer and winter,
• hydro power in the Nordic system is less used during the summer,
• co-generation is less used during summer,
• producers might adjust their prices predicting the peak usage.
Whatever the case, prices during peak consumption hours can be high even if
the overall consumption falls.
For the balancing part, we also included high price power producers at the
top end of the merit order curve (not included in Fig. 4). This serves for two
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purposes. First, they incorporate the reserves of the TSO procures which are
typically used only once the market balancing power is used up. Second, they
represent a kind of buffer that the system will run into when a large amount of
balancing power is needed. This power then comes at a (very) high price, as it
would be in the real world [44] (up to the upper price limit of Nord Pool 3000
€/MWh).
In the case of a lack of available up-balancing energy, the model is set up to
stop the simulation with an error, while in the real world this would typically
call for more extreme measures like load-shedding or even a black-out. However,
such kind of black-outs almost never occur in the real world. We therefore
added a big (1 GW) and expensive (3000€/MWh) power plant at the top of
the balancing merit-order curve to represent the aforementioned problematic
situation (so our simulation will never reach a black-out or brown-out, but this
“extreme case” will be captured by a very expensive power).
On the consumer side, we setup the system with a peak to peak difference
of about 14%, which is set based on the maximum to minimum difference in
daily load-cycle in the Finnish power system in the data set from 2015 that we
analyzed. The maximum consumption is 12.6 GW.
3. Results
The central part of our results can be seen in Figs. 5-9, showing that, above
a certain ratio of flexible users in the system, flexibility guided by real-time price
(spot price) dramatically increases the total electricity costs. In other words, the
savings that price-reactive users are expected to bring do not realized. However,
if we integrate the flexibility into the market with exclusive groups, the savings
can be sustained regardless of the ratio of flexible users. This effect results
mainly from the consideration of the physical reality, captured by the balancing
market.
This can be seen in Fig. 5 specifically in the center plot where the usage
related costs (i.e. the consumers’ individual tariff based on the spot prices)
14
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errors.
remain low. The system costs resulting from the balancing, however, quickly
rise after a certain ratio of flexible users, as shown in the right part of the plot.
This behavior can be explained as follows. The flexible users try to avoid high
spot prices from the day ahead market, as they are billed directly according
to them when they adopt the real-time pricing policy. After a certain ratio is
exceeded, the usage pattern from the flexible users influences when high prices
occur. This then leads to the peculiar situation that the users will never do
what they were forecasted to do; the demand predictions by the utilities are
never realized due to flexible-optimizing consumers. If the utilities expect users
have their peak consumption during a certain time of the day, their bids will
increase prices during that hour. This high price will lead to users avoiding
these very hours. This in turn means that down-balancing is needed in the
high-price hours, while up-balancing is needed for other low priced hours. It is
exactly this balancing that will drive the system costs up.
A more detailed view into the simulation can be seen in Fig. 6, which shows
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price, demand, and balancing power for five days of simulation under integrated
and RTP regime. It illustrates how price and demand are misaligned in the
RTP regime, leading to a high need of balancing power. Another interesting
observation can be made based on Fig. 6: even though it would be possible to
create a flat load curve, eliminating all peaks, this is not the chosen solution by
the market algorithm. This is due to non-linear effects in the merit order curve.
Above a certain level of consumption, power plants with higher costs need to
run. It can therefore be cheaper to utilize them fully, once they are turned on
but keep them off during the rest of the day. This situation might change with
available power plants.
Figs. 7 and 8 present similar results to Fig. 6 considering RTP and inte-
grated regime with 30% and 50% of flexible users; these plots corroborate our
previous argument. It is also worth stating that, while it is possible to argue
that the changes caused by RTP may be predicted in the demand forecast, this
does not change the previously described dynamics. A difference in price is as-
sumed to lead to a shift of demand. Once this shift in demand is big enough to
drive day-ahead price changes, users see every day a different “real-time” price
curve based on their past behavior even including their expected changes. As
the actual consumption happens one day after the daily spot price is formed,
the predictions that create that price cannot be realized as the spot (day ahead)
price acts as the ultimate guide of the consumers’ consumption pattern of that
day whose price was formed one day before. All in all, the system works with
self-referential predictions, which imply that the predictions cannot be realized.
This unfortunate (idealist) deployment of flexibility via real-time (spot)
prices, instead of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, creates its converse: a never-
fulfilling prophecy. But, by knowing the systemic mechanism that creates this
outcome, the justification to use EXGs as a tool to integrate flexibility in large
scale without creating extra costs becomes straightforward: as far as the sched-
ule of the flexible demand is set in the day ahead market, there will be no
excessive need for balancing power so the system costs stay low.
Intuitively, one might expect that, from the perspective of the individual
19
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user, it is not beneficial to become flexible once the system under a real-time
pricing regime reaches the point where costs start to rise again. In other words,
one might expect that the system will automatically stay close to this optimal
point. As can be seen in Fig. 9, this is not necessarily the case. The plot shows
the cost advantage of flexible users (the ones who are able to shift their peak
usage) over ordinary users considering: the Real-time Price (RTP), and the
integrated regime where exclusive groups (EXGs) are used. We can see that the
cost advantage for flexible users in the RTP regime never goes below, or even
close to, zero. This in turn means that it is always beneficial to be a flexible
user, since such users always pays less then the ordinary ones, regardless of
the system configuration. Assuming that there is no lower limit for switching,
which is given by the return of investment for becoming a flexible user, this
would drive the system to the worst possible state. This fact resembles the
well-known tragedy of the commons problem [45].
While the same incentives still exist in the integrated regime, they lead to a
different outcome: it accommodates the users’ dynamic without increasing the
total costs. In any case, it is worth noting that a direct comparison between
flexible and normal users under the two different regimes within the same system
cannot be drawn from this graph. Our analysis considers that, depending on
the setting considered, flexible consumers are exclusively RTP or integrated,
they do not coexist in the simulation; i.e. we only consider scenarios: (i) RTP
flexible users with normal users, and (ii) integrated-regime flexible users with
normal users. Therefore Fig. 9 do not present any comparison between the
two regimes (this conclusions can be drawn form Fig. 5 already). Instead, Fig.
9 illustrates the internal relation between the two different kinds of users in a
specific regime. While a large amount of flexibility increases overall costs in the
RTP regime, it remains beneficial for individual consumers to become flexible
in comparison to the normal users. In the integrated regime, we see the gains
are relatively even for high ratio of flexible users with diminishing individuals
gains.
In Fig. 10, we simulated the effects of adding an intermittent renewable
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Figure 10: Effects of an intermittent renewable power available randomly during each simu-
lation day (up to 2 GW peak) with a certain forecast error. Left: the cost increase vs. the
ratio of flexible users for RTP and integrated regimes with and without intermittent renewable
sources. Center: the cost increase of the RTP regime over the integrated without and with
renewables. Right: the cost increase of the integrated regime with and without renewables for
the same regime. The plot in the center is computed as the the gap between the curves with
and without renewables considering from the left plot, while the right plot is the gap between
the base cases and the ones with renewables.
source to the system. More specifically, we added a producer that would provide
up to 2 GW at random periods during the day. The duration and shape of the
periods are also random. Additionally, the realized output differs from the
forecasted one.
We identify the following effects of the presence of such a source. During the
times when renewable power is available, the day ahead market prices fall, as
less conventional power needs to be dispatched. Then, more balancing power is
required to cover the differences between renewable forecast and realized output.
For the system under real time pricing, we expect a bigger impact, i.e. a drastic
cost increase with a lower ratio of flexible users, as the utilities do not predict
based on the availability of those renewable sources.
The results in Fig. 10 corroborate this view, as we see a bigger cost increase
for a share of 30% of flexible users. When comparing the systems with and
without renewable energy in the respective regimes, we verify the cost advantage
that the renewable sources bring is sustained in the integrated regime, while it
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varies noticeably in the RTP one. Overall, the cost reduction with the addition
of renewables is greater than the gains through flexibility. Additionally, the
flexibility does not provide bigger benefits in the renewable system.
4. Discussion
Even though variable pricing schemes are implemented for quite some time,
only very recently researchers started to identify possible problems that arise
when they become massively used as a guide for shifting flexible loads. For ex-
ample, problems related to market instabilities were presented in [46], while
instabilities of the physical grid due to these effects were discussed in [47].
In [48] undesirable demand synchronization between independent agents have
been demonstrated with a simple agent-based model and external price signals.
With the specific example of electric vehicles, the work of [49] shows a type of
“avalanche effect” where the charging times of all vehicles synchronize in low
price times.
With this work, we expect to illustrate problems in the same realm, but
with a different – and quite specific – working mechanism as well as an already
existing solution to this very problem. We consider the electricity system as
a whole, so that each element influences each other, following the regulatory
structure defined by the market as it currently exists and the customer pricing
schemes already in place in many EU countries.
As any other model, ours is also built upon a number of simplifications[50];
we in fact consider the proposed model as the simplest yet functional version
to demonstrate the effects previously discussed. Several of these simplifications,
however, should be examined to better understand the validity of the results.
Probably, the clearest simplification is the assumption of a sinusoidal load curve
that is only flexible in one dimension. In reality, the load curve is composed out
of a number of devices installed in a household or commercial building. Each
device has a very distinguished consumption pattern and flexibility. Therefore
the optimization inside a household would change the load curve in multiple
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dimensions and possibly converge to a different optimum for every new day. We
do not expect, though, any fundamental changes to the results if more details
and degrees of freedom would be considered in the load modeling. Even in the
extreme case where each consumer would be able to freely shape his consumption
(for example, with sufficient local storage), it is unlikely that the system would
converge to a more favorable state in the RTP regime. Small differences in
hourly prices would always create incentives to load curves that are not flat as
users try to gain by utilizing low price hours and avoiding higher priced ones.
On the other hand, it might be plausible to assume that some of the effects
will be enhanced by a more detailed load model. For instance, if a single flex-
ible device like a household’s dishwasher is optimizing its own usage following
the day-ahead prices, it then tries to minimize costs by allocating its activity
accordingly. Assuming that this phase is reasonably similar for all dishwashers,
the optimization process would lead to all dish washers to be activated during
the same hour of the day. In fact, it is very likely that all dishwashers would
turn on at same second of the same hour to optimally use the time where energy
is cheap according to the real-time tariff. This would lead to an extremely steep
jump in consumption and a concentration of the need for balancing energy, pos-
sibly (and most probably) increasing system costs even more. Similar effect has
been described for heating in [47].
The last example also illustrates another assumption concerning the load
modeling. We consider that there are no costs involved in shifting the energy
usage, which is contrary to what is often presumed. In reality, this might differ
from appliance to appliance, where energy storage will have opportunity cost
or cycle costs, while a dish washer can just turn on whenever it wants within
a certain predetermined time frame. However, we believe most flexible devices
will be more like a dishwasher and not like a battery, as it seems unlike that
consumers would be willing to trade their comfort for money, given how little
money can be saved [51, 52]. Even for the charging of an electric car battery,
the user might only be concerned about the battery being fully charged in
the morning and afternoon hours for the trip from and back to work. Hence,
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the optimization would deal less with opportunity costs than the actual need.
Likewise, consumers might be willing to have the set point of their heating
changed up or down by one or two degrees as this is mostly unnoticeable, but
no changes in how warm the house feels would be tolerated as the savings will,
at most, sum up to a single digit amount of € per day.
Assuming no shifting costs may have important implications. First, it might
lead to a more volatile system behavior as it might be profitable to exploit
even very small differences in price. Second, it might result in the lack of a
damping factor for the system to converge to a stable price equilibrium (if a
more analytical approach is used). For our results, both of these factors should
not be of concern, as the price differences are rather big and the shift of user
behavior only occurs once a day, so damping of oscillating user behavior during
the day is not an issue here.
Furthermore, we believe almost all changes in consumption will happen
through automation, not from changes in human behavior or routines (i.e. the
peak hours are closely related to the working day so the human-driven consump-
tion patterns follow the daily routine: waking up, eating, showering and so on).
This implies that, if changes in consumption are driven by human behavior,
they will be slower and less reactive to short-term changes. If an appliance is
automated to react to a certain external signals, it might not make any differ-
ence for the user what that signal is. All in all, if the dishwasher turns on driven
by pricing information or a remote control signal, it is indistinguishable from
the user perspective, as he or she would not have direct influence on either of
them.
Another grid element that exhibits many of the above properties is the elec-
tric vehicle during charging. Since charging is flexible in its starting time and
also in duration (and therefore peak power consumption), it can have massive
impacts especially on distribution grids[53, 54, 55]. As pointed out in [56] a cen-
tralized solution to coordinate charging that assures all network parameters are
accounted for is most likely needed, which would fits with the EXG integration
approach.
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An additional concern might be related to the ability of utilities to forecast
user behavior. At first, one might assume that it is possible to better forecast
how users react to prices with a more sophisticated learning algorithm. While
this might be true to a certain extent, several assumptions of our model pre-
vent any big gains from this perspective. The important part to consider is
the feedback loop which happens between markets, users and utilities. This
feedback loop is not closed within any given day as utilities have to make their
predictions about user behavior before the market closing time, which is before
the beginning of the operational day. Users, however, can alter their behavior
based on the outcome of the market phase during the operational day. In other
words, users can always change their behavior after the utilities made public
what they forecasted.
Another way for the utility to improve the outcome appears to be price-
dependent orders. The idea is the following: a utility can learn the flexibility
of its users and then bid a price-dependent order into the market, which re-
flects that, for high prices, less energy will be consumed and vice versa. We did
not include these in the modeling as they offer no significant improvement to
resolve the situation explained before. The hourly price-dependent order does
not correctly reflect the shift in demand. If the price is low, more energy will
be bought, but this does not necessarily correspond to a reduction of demand
during another part of the day. This mechanism works well for industrial con-
sumers that might increase production of a good if prices are low or rely on
internal power generation if prices are high enough, as these processes are typ-
ically without temporal interlocking (e.g. production can be increased during
one hour without the need to decrease during another hour). Furthermore, the
price-dependent order does not work with the assumptions made here, where
a shift in demand might not be based on the absolute but rather the relative
price (like the automated dishwasher that just looks for the cheapest hour, not
for a specific price). There are numerous processes like this in the industry,
the private sector and in households, which will only run once, and cannot run
again even if cheaper power would be available. It is important to point out
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that the model presented here also demonstrates that flexible users in the RTP
regime can bring benefits but only when their scale is limited, as can be seen in
Fig. 5 and in Fig. 7. In this case, the price-dependent behavior of flexible users
can be correctly forecasted by the utilities and all the assumed benefits of RTP
combined with flexibility shall be realized.
It appears that this problem might be solved by using a price that is closer to
real-time than the day-ahead price, namely the intraday price or the balancing
price. While the instabilities of such system have been demonstrated in, for
example, [46], there are also logical arguments against it. Every market stage
is based around binding settlements. If a bid or an offer was accepted, it is a
binding settlement to either produce or consume a certain amount of power. In
the real-time pricing regime, there is no binding agreement. This is especially
problematic since the price is the only information available; yet there is only
a finite amount of power that can be produced for that price – although, from
the customer side, it appears as if the amount is unlimited.
This is of course not true in any market. It is not possible to buy all the
stock of a company for its “stock price”. The stock price is either shown as the
gap between the bids and offers or the last successful trade. Neither of those
are the price at which you can currently buy shares. Similarly, one cannot buy
unlimited amounts of butter for the price listed in one specific supermarket: one
can only buy the quantity in its storage.
It should be also noted that the remote control signal to a device can take
many forms. For example, the utility may have run an internal auction with
all participating appliances or may have an internal pricing scheme. Similar
ideas have been portrayed in [57, 58]. Either way, the utility needs to somehow
schedule the automated devices, at least up to a certain extent. Otherwise, the
issues regarding synchronization and its undesirable consequences may emerge.
Given these simplifications and limitations, we are aware that our current
results cannot be used as a predictor for how big a RTP system can be safely
scaled up. However, it shows the systemic drawbacks of this widely promoted
solution and the advantages of a market integrated solution (if implemented
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properly). We further believe that some critical misconceptions about the cur-
rently proposed RTP solution should be considered in the discussion about this
topic, as follows:
• Contrary to what the name suggests, prices are not updated in real time
as we commonly understand it, but rather are determined up to 36 hours
before the operational hour.
• Prices reflect binding settlements from the market place. A change of the
agreed schedule breaks the contract.
• Since order books are closed, it is unknowable how much power is available
for a given price, making optimal scheduling impossible.
Besides, it is worth pointing out that studies of demand response for house-
hold customers and RTP have typically found little benefit for the customer[59,
52]. In a relevant case-study of the implementation of RTP in Chicago [60], the
authors found that the cost of the metering infrastructure is likely to exceed
the benefits gained efficiency: “More importantly, although there are significant
uncertainties, these efficiency gains do not appear to overwhelm reasonable esti-
mates of the cost of conserving energy or installing advanced metering infrastruc-
ture. These results do not make a strong case for optional or population-wide
residential real time pricing.”
As final point of the discussion we would like to point out a drawback of
the market integrated solution based on EXGs. Since the matching of bids
and orders is essentially an optimization problem, e.g. selecting a set with the
highest social welfare considering several border conditions, like transmission
constraints, is a big computational task. The computational effort needed to
solve this problem is already quite big for the European market: all orders (Nord
Pool and EPEX combined) are put in only one order book so that transmission
constraints can be optimized for. The size of the optimization problem leads
to a lack of transparency of the solution found by the market, which is becom-
ing a growing concern [43]. Adding more of the so-called complex orders (like
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the proposed exclusive block orders) would dramatically increase the compu-
tational complexity of the optimization problem, consequently decreasing the
transparency of the market solutions.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an extension of the agent-based spot and balanc-
ing market model proposed in [19] to include flexible consumers. The model was
calibrated as a representation of an electricity system similar to the Finnish one,
as part of Nord Pool. From this model, we analyzed the effects of two distinct
regimes of demand-response, namely “real-time pricing” and integrated. In the
first one, consumers optimize their consumption based on the tariff scheme that
charges them according to the spot market prices for the day. In the second
one, the consumers’ flexibility is integrated into the market by aggregating it
on the utility level and then scheduling the flexible usage following the profile
accepted by the market.
We showed that above a certain ratio of flexible consumers inside the market
area, the real-time pricing regime leads to a situation where the utility is unable
to correctly predict the realized consumption of its users. We argue that this
inability is a systemic feature, which can be corrected the integrated solution
using existing market products and a more direct control of the flexibility. Our
results also indicate that the presence of intermittent renewable sources can
decrease the electricity prices, but it does not change the qualitative behavior
of the two studied regimes. The proposed model is open-source and available
on-line at [42].
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Appendix A. Modeling of Appliances
To evaluate the consistence of the proposed simplified load profile, we design
an experiment to test whether the downsides of RTP still valid when more
realistic load curves are used. We set a system in a quite different manner
compared to the setup employed in the main body of this paper. Instead of
sinusoidal load curves we rely on the following model for the demand: Every
utility has one agent that follows a load curve with two peak during the course
of a day, one during morning and one during evening hours, as can be seen in
Fig. A.11 on the right. The sole task of this agent is to represent some form
of base-load. Each utility has a set of agents that represent appliances, which
can either be normal or optimizing, and each utility has the same amount of
optimizing and normal appliances. Every appliance has to run once during a
day for about one hour and consumes a given amount of power during that time
[40, 61]. The duration and amount of power differ slightly for each appliance.
For the normal appliances the time when they are on is distributed during the
day with a distribution mirroring the demand curve, so more appliances are
running during the morning and evening hours.
As before, the optimizing appliances can either be under RTP or integrated
into the market via profile orders handled by the utilities. During the simulation,
we altered the amount of power that is consumed by either normal or optimizing
appliances proportionally, so that as a whole they would represent about 250.000
appliances with a power demand of 3kW each.
As can be seen in Fig. A.11 on the left, the results are comparable to our
main findings, and can be understood via the same concepts. As seen on the
right side of Fig. A.11, the appliances under RTP always try to jump to the
cheapest hour during mid-day. The utilities try to forecast to which hour they
will move. However this very prediction is bid into the market and will therefore
alter what hour will be the cheapest one. Consequently, the appliances under
RTP are constantly producing a need for additional procurement that comes at
higher costs. This ultimately drives up the system costs.
30
0 100000 200000
flex. appliances
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
sy
te
m
 c
os
t i
nc
re
as
e 
(
/M
W
h)
RTP
int.
5 10 15 20
h
10.0
10.5
11.0
11.5
12.0
TW
BASE
RTP
Figure A.11: Comparison of small flexible loads (e.g. smart dishwashers) with a power con-
sumption of about 3kW for about 60 min. On the left we see the results of coordinating these
loads via EXG and market integration or RTP. On the right we see the base-load curve and
the ”jumping” of loads in the RTP regime, where all appliances try to run during the cheapest
hour.
In the integrated regime, the market can coordinate when the appliances will
run and procure the needed power beforehand, so no additional costs for power
procurement after the day-ahead market will occur. Of course, the effects in this
setup are much smaller than the effects shown in the paper since the influence
of the appliances on the peak load times are smaller. However, this shows that
just a fleet of 250.000 smart dishwashers might be able to create negative results
for the whole system if not controlled correctly.
We would like to point out that this research path needs to be further devel-
oped to have a better understanding of the effects of different load curves, of dif-
ferent (group of) appliances and of the inclusion of more boundary conditions[38,
39] on the flexibility and its management. However, this is outside the scope
of this article, which focuses on understanding the underlying effects and the
problem in general.
Appendix B. Model Description
In the following, we present the pseudo-code representation of the proposed
model. Some details of the implementation necessarily need to be omitted for
simplicity; these details are available in the source code itself, available on-line
at [42]. For example, we choose to exclude the details of the calculation of the
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balancing costs as it is a rather long process. This, however, just follows the
accounting rules of the Nord Pool system. We advise to start with Algorithm 1
as it is the main loop iterating over the days of the simulation.
Algorithm 1 Run For Days
1: for day ← 1, days do
2: system.startDay() . Internal setup
3: prices, schedules, profiles← system.runMarket()
4: system.setSchedule(schedules)
5: system.setProfiles(profiles)
6: system.updatePostMarket()
7: balancingPrices← system.performBalancing()
8: system.nextDay() . Used for state reset of agents and cost calculation
9: end for
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Algorithm 2 Run Market
1: procedure runMarket
2: supply = system.getSupply() . Collect offers from producers
3: profiles← []
4: for util in utilities do . Collect profiles from utilities
5: profiles.add(util.profilesForDay())
6: end for
7: selection, best selection← system.lastSelection
8: value, best← eval(selection, supply, profiles)
9: for i← 0, n do
10: T ← ANNEAL TEMP/(i + 1)
11: move vec← randomVector()
12: new selection← selection + move vec
13: new value← eval(new selection, supply, profiles)
14: if exp(new value− value)/T OR new value > value then
15: selection← new selection
16: value← new value
17: if new value > best then
18: best selection← new selection
19: best← new value
20: end if
21: end if
22: end for
23: prices, schedule← createSchedule(profiles(best selection), supply)
24: return prices,schedule,best selection
25: end procedure
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Algorithm 3 Evaluate Profile
1: procedure eval(selection,supply,profiles)
2: profile← profiles(selection)
3: surplus← 0
4: for hour ← 0, 23 do
5: price, schedule← priceForDemand(profile(hour), supply(hour))
6: for item← schedule do
7: surplus← surplus + item.accepted · (price− item.price)
8: end for
9: surplus← surplus + supply(hour) · (3000− price)
10: end for
11: end procedure
Algorithm 4 Price For Demand
1: procedure priceForDemand(demand,supply)
2: supply ← sort(supply)
3: available← 0
4: schedule← []
5: for offer in supply do
6: available← available + offer.power
7: price← offer.price
8: schedule.add(ScheduleItem(offer))
9: if available ≥ usage then
10: return price, schedule
11: end if
12: end for
13: end procedure
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Algorithm 5 Create Schedule
1: procedure createSchedule(profile,supply)
2: schedule← []
3: prices← []
4: for hour ← 0, 23 do
5: schedH, priceH ← (priceForDemand)(profile(hour), supply(hour))
6: schedule.add(schedH)
7: prices.add(priceH)
8: end for
9: return prices, schedule
10: end procedure
Algorithm 6 Update Post Market
1: procedure updatePostMarket
2: for user in allUsers do
3: user.updatePostMarket()
4: end for
5: end procedure
Algorithm 7 User Update Post Market
1: procedure updatePostMarket
2: if isOptimizer AND isRTP then
3: optimizeUsage()
4: else if isOptimizer AND hasProfiles then
5: updateUsage()
6: end if
7: end procedure
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Algorithm 8 Balancing Part 1
1: procedure performBalancing
2: demand← system.minuteDemand() . actual demand of users with
minute resolution
3: production← system.minuteProduction() . actual production of
producers with minute resolution
4: diff ← demand− production
5: diff15← sum15(diff) . Sum differences for 15 minute slots
6: prices← list(96)
7: for t← 0, 95 do
8: if diff15(t) > LIMIT then
9: offers← getUpOffers())
10: demand← diff15(t)
11: for offer in offers do
12: demand← demand− offer.power
13: prices[t]← offer.price
14: if demand > 0 then
15: updateSchedule(offer, offer.power)
16: else
17: updateSchedule(offer, offer.power + demand)
18: break
19: end if
20: end for
21: end if
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Algorithm 9 Balancing Part 2
22: if diff15(t) < −LIMIT then
23: demand← diff15(t)
24: offers← getDownOffers())
25: for offer in offers do
26: demand← demand + offer.power
27: prices[t]← offer.price
28: if demand < 0 then
29: updateSchedule(offer, offer.power)
30: else
31: updateSchedule(offer, offer.power − demand)
32: break
33: end if
34: end for
35: end if
36: end for
37: diff60← sum60(diff) . Sum differences for 60 minute slots
38: priceH ← list(24)
39: for t← 0, 23 do
40: if diff60(t) > LIMIT then
41: priceH[t]← max(price[t · 4 : t · 4 + 4])
42: else if diff60(t) < −LIMIT then
43: priceH[t]← min(price[t · 4 : t · 4 + 4])
44: end if
45: end for
46: return priceH
47: end procedure
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Appendix C.
Table C.1: System Configuration
Idx. Capacity Marginal Cost €/MWh Reg. Factor Reg. Update Factor Min Run Factor
1 232 5.00 5% 2 0.1
2 160.5 5.00 5% 2 0.1
3 134 5.00 5% 2 0.1
4 128 5.00 5% 2 0.1
5 116 5.00 5% 2 0.1
6 105 5.00 5% 2 0.1
7 105 5.00 5% 2 0.1
8 90 5.00 5% 2 0.1
9 88 5.00 5% 2 0.1
10 85 5.00 5% 2 0.1
11 82.8 5.00 5% 2 0.1
12 76 5.00 5% 2 0.1
13 76 5.00 5% 2 0.1
14 76 5.00 5% 2 0.1
15 75 5.00 5% 2 0.1
16 75 5.00 5% 2 0.1
17 72.6 5.00 5% 2 0.1
18 72 5.00 5% 2 0.1
19 72 5.00 5% 2 0.1
20 67.3 5.00 5% 2 0.1
21 64 5.00 5% 2 0.1
22 48 5.00 5% 2 0.1
23 45 5.00 5% 2 0.1
24 43 5.00 5% 2 0.1
25 41 5.00 5% 2 0.1
26 40 5.00 5% 2 0.1
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27 40 5.00 5% 2 0.1
28 39.3 5.00 5% 2 0.1
29 35.7 5.00 5% 2 0.1
30 35 5.00 5% 2 0.1
31 34.5 5.00 5% 2 0.1
32 32.8 5.00 5% 2 0.1
33 30 5.00 5% 2 0.1
34 28 5.00 5% 2 0.1
35 26.3 5.00 5% 2 0.1
36 25.1 5.00 5% 2 0.1
37 25 5.00 5% 2 0.1
38 20.5 5.00 5% 2 0.1
39 19 5.00 5% 2 0.1
40 19 5.00 5% 2 0.1
41 17.5 5.00 5% 2 0.1
42 16.5 5.00 5% 2 0.1
43 16 5.00 5% 2 0.1
44 14.2 5.00 5% 2 0.1
45 13.5 5.00 5% 2 0.1
46 12 5.00 5% 2 0.1
47 11.4 5.00 5% 2 0.1
48 8.8 5.00 5% 2 0.1
49 8.5 5.00 5% 2 0.1
50 7.8 5.00 5% 2 0.1
51 7.5 5.00 5% 2 0.1
52 7 5.00 5% 2 0.1
53 6 5.00 5% 2 0.1
54 5 5.00 5% 2 0.1
55 4.2 5.00 5% 2 0.1
56 4 5.00 5% 2 0.1
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57 3.9 5.00 5% 2 0.1
58 3.8 5.00 5% 2 0.1
59 3.5 5.00 5% 2 0.1
60 3 5.00 5% 2 0.1
61 2.9 5.00 5% 2 0.1
62 2.8 5.00 5% 2 0.1
63 2.7 5.00 5% 2 0.1
64 2.7 5.00 5% 2 0.1
65 2.5 5.00 5% 2 0.1
66 2 5.00 5% 2 0.1
67 1.6 5.00 5% 2 0.1
68 1.5 5.00 5% 2 0.1
69 1.4 5.00 5% 2 0.1
70 1.4 5.00 5% 2 0.1
71 1.3 5.00 5% 2 0.1
72 1 5.00 5% 2 0.1
73 0.9 5.00 5% 2 0.1
74 0.8 5.00 5% 2 0.1
75 0 5.00 5% 2 0.1
76 192 5.00 5% 2 0
77 182 5.00 5% 2 0
78 146 5.00 5% 2 0
79 133 5.00 5% 2 0
80 131 5.00 5% 2 0
81 130 5.00 5% 2 0
82 124 5.00 5% 2 0
83 106 5.00 5% 2 0
84 101 5.00 5% 2 0
85 95 5.00 5% 2 0
86 85 5.00 5% 2 0
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87 81 5.00 5% 2 0
88 72 5.00 5% 2 0
89 70 5.00 5% 2 0
90 61.5 5.00 5% 2 0
91 60 5.00 5% 2 0
92 57.8 5.00 5% 2 0
93 55 5.00 5% 2 0
94 50.7 5.00 5% 2 0
95 47.3 5.00 5% 2 0
96 45 5.00 5% 2 0
97 44.8 5.00 5% 2 0
98 42.1 5.00 5% 2 0
99 42 5.00 5% 2 0
100 38.5 5.00 5% 2 0
101 38 5.00 5% 2 0
102 37.9 5.00 5% 2 0
103 35 5.00 5% 2 0
104 32.5 5.00 5% 2 0
105 32 5.00 5% 2 0
106 30 5.00 5% 2 0
107 30 5.00 5% 2 0
108 27 5.00 5% 2 0
109 26 5.00 5% 2 0
110 25 5.00 5% 2 0
111 25 5.00 5% 2 0
112 25 5.00 5% 2 0
113 24 5.00 5% 2 0
114 24 5.00 5% 2 0
115 21.2 5.00 5% 2 0
116 21 5.00 5% 2 0
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117 21 5.00 5% 2 0
118 20 5.00 5% 2 0
119 19.7 5.00 5% 2 0
120 19.1 5.00 5% 2 0
121 17 5.00 5% 2 0
122 16 5.00 5% 2 0
123 15 5.00 5% 2 0
124 15 5.00 5% 2 0
125 14 5.00 5% 2 0
126 14 5.00 5% 2 0
127 13.5 5.00 5% 2 0
128 12.9 5.00 5% 2 0
129 12 5.00 5% 2 0
130 11.5 5.00 5% 2 0
131 11 5.00 5% 2 0
132 11 5.00 5% 2 0
133 9.8 5.00 5% 2 0
134 9.5 5.00 5% 2 0
135 8.9 5.00 5% 2 0
136 8.6 5.00 5% 2 0
137 8.5 5.00 5% 2 0
138 8.5 5.00 5% 2 0
139 7.8 5.00 5% 2 0
140 7.6 5.00 5% 2 0
141 6.9 5.00 5% 2 0
142 6.8 5.00 5% 2 0
143 6.8 5.00 5% 2 0
144 6.7 5.00 5% 2 0
145 6.5 5.00 5% 2 0
146 6.5 5.00 5% 2 0
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147 6.3 5.00 5% 2 0
148 6.3 5.00 5% 2 0
149 6 5.00 5% 2 0
150 5.6 5.00 5% 2 0
151 5.5 5.00 5% 2 0
152 5.4 5.00 5% 2 0
153 4.6 5.00 5% 2 0
154 4.6 5.00 5% 2 0
155 4.5 5.00 5% 2 0
156 4.5 5.00 5% 2 0
157 4.5 5.00 5% 2 0
158 4.19 5.00 5% 2 0
159 3.8 5.00 5% 2 0
160 3.7 5.00 5% 2 0
161 3.7 5.00 5% 2 0
162 3.6 5.00 5% 2 0
163 3.3 5.00 5% 2 0
164 3.2 5.00 5% 2 0
165 3.2 5.00 5% 2 0
166 3.01 5.00 5% 2 0
167 3 5.00 5% 2 0
168 3 5.00 5% 2 0
169 3 5.00 5% 2 0
170 3 5.00 5% 2 0
171 2.9 5.00 5% 2 0
172 2.8 5.00 5% 2 0
173 2.5 5.00 5% 2 0
174 2.4 5.00 5% 2 0
175 2.3 5.00 5% 2 0
176 2.1 5.00 5% 2 0
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177 2 5.00 5% 2 0
178 2 5.00 5% 2 0
179 1.9 5.00 5% 2 0
180 1.8 5.00 5% 2 0
181 1.8 5.00 5% 2 0
182 1.8 5.00 5% 2 0
183 1.8 5.00 5% 2 0
184 1.8 5.00 5% 2 0
185 1.8 5.00 5% 2 0
186 1.8 5.00 5% 2 0
187 1.8 5.00 5% 2 0
188 1.8 5.00 5% 2 0
189 1.6 5.00 5% 2 0
190 1.6 5.00 5% 2 0
191 1.5 5.00 5% 2 0
192 1.5 5.00 5% 2 0
193 1.5 5.00 5% 2 0
194 1.42 5.00 5% 2 0
195 1.4 5.00 5% 2 0
196 1.3 5.00 5% 2 0
197 1.3 5.00 5% 2 0
198 1.2 5.00 5% 2 0
199 1.2 5.00 5% 2 0
200 1.2 5.00 5% 2 0
201 1.2 5.00 5% 2 0
202 1.2 5.00 5% 2 0
203 1.2 5.00 5% 2 0
204 1.1 5.00 5% 2 0
205 1 5.00 5% 2 0
206 1 5.00 5% 2 0
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207 1 5.00 5% 2 0
208 1 5.00 5% 2 0
209 0.9 5.00 5% 2 0
210 0.9 5.00 5% 2 0
211 0.75 5.00 5% 2 0
212 0.7 5.00 5% 2 0
213 50 15.59 5% 2 0
214 880 16.18 1% 2 0
215 880 16.18 1% 2 0
216 496 16.18 1% 2 0
217 496 16.18 1% 2 0
218 13.2 22.51 5% 2 0
219 565 25.36 5% 2 0
220 148 26.07 5% 2 0.1
221 12.3 26.13 5% 2 0.1
222 80 31.69 5% 2 0.1
223 81.4 32.40 5% 2 0.1
224 163 34.22 5% 2 0.1
225 218 36.71 5% 2 0.1
226 210 37.57 5% 2 0.1
227 75 38.95 5% 2 0.1
228 89 39.01 5% 2 0.1
229 16 39.38 5% 2 0.1
230 86 40.37 5% 2 0.1
231 86 40.37 5% 2 0.1
232 61 42.23 5% 2 0.1
233 154 44.60 25% 2 0.1
234 190 48.78 25% 2 0.1
235 112 51.14 25% 2 0.1
236 108 52.00 25% 2 0.1
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237 470 53.00 25% 2 0.1
238 15 54.00 25% 2 0.1
239 234 56.00 25% 2 0.1
240 37.5 57.00 25% 2 0.1
241 60 58.00 25% 2 0.1
242 160 61.01 25% 2 0.1
243 50 61.03 25% 2 0.1
244 62.2 61.24 25% 2 0.1
245 32 62.45 25% 2 0.1
246 147 62.49 25% 2 0.1
247 129 63.77 25% 2 0.1
248 76 63.88 25% 2 0.1
249 12 64.21 25% 2 0.1
250 6 65.79 25% 2 0.1
251 45 65.81 25% 2 0.1
252 70 67.17 25% 2 0.1
253 125 67.20 25% 2 0.1
254 27.7 69.94 25% 2 0.1
255 10 71.00 25% 2 0.1
256 22 73.44 25% 2 0.1
257 49 73.87 25% 2 0.1
258 5.5 74.78 25% 2 0.1
259 6.2 76.46 25% 2 0.1
260 50 76.78 25% 2 0.1
261 58 78.01 25% 2 0.1
262 20 79.65 25% 2 0.1
263 20 81.42 25% 2 0.1
264 12.5 83.33 25% 2 0.1
265 20 84.54 25% 2 0.1
266 15 85.45 25% 2 0.1
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267 4.6 89.42 25% 2 0.1
268 60 89.57 25% 2 0.1
269 85 90.40 25% 2 0.1
270 8.4 91.40 25% 2 0.1
271 32.4 92.40 25% 2 0.1
272 6 93.19 25% 2 0.1
273 4.5 97.05 25% 2 0.1
274 17.5 98.45 25% 2 0.1
275 14.42 100.78 25% 2 0
276 11 102.42 25% 2 0
277 12 115.96 25% 2 0
278 4.5 121.87 25% 2 0
279 9 124.92 25% 2 0
280 1.4 128.62 25% 2 0
281 14.5 140.00 50% 2 0
282 3.7 141.00 50% 2 0
283 4 170.00 50% 2 0
284 0.6 180.00 50% 2 0
285 102 190.00 50% 1 0
286 100.5 200.00 50% 1 0
287 332.6 210.00 50% 1 0
288 180 220.00 50% 1 0
289 60 230.00 50% 1 0
290 26 240.00 50% 1 0
291 52 250.00 50% 1 0
292 5 255.00 50% 2 0
293 28 280.00 50% 2 0
294 4.1 300.00 50% 2 0
295 4.5 350.00 50% 2 0
296 15 400.00 50% 2 0
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297 4.1 450.00 50% 2 0
298 4.5 500.00 50% 2 0
299 50 500.00 50% 1 0
300 118 500.00 50% 1 0
301 40 500.00 50% 1 0
302 40 500.00 50% 1 0
303 40 500.00 50% 1 0
304 27 500.00 50% 1 0
305 1000 1000 100% 1 0
306 2000 3000 100% 1 0
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